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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND TREATMENT OF THE DATA
The results of the Presidential election of 1948 pro duced one of the most stunning upsets in the history of
elections in the United States .

The odds against Harry

Truman's winning re- election were considerable .

s.

As President ,

he was following one of the outstanding politicians in
American history , Franklin Delano Roosevelt . 1
In April of 1948 , disaffected New Dealers and many
city political bosses , feeling that Truman could not win
the election , attempted to convince first General Dwight
D. Eisenhower and then Supreme Court Justice William 0 .
Douglas to run for President on the Democratic ticket . 2
Up until the time of the Democratic National Convention in
July , other influential members of the Democratic Party
urged Truman to capitulate in favor of someone else .

Poli -

tical experts of both parties who were supposedly "in the
know" were saying that Truman could not possibly be re elected in the November election .

During the Democratic

1David Lawrence , "Poor Mr . Truman!" United States News
and World Report , XXIV (April 9 , 1948) , 36o
2Edward S . Corwin and Louis W. Koenig , The Presidency
Today (New York : New York University Press , 1956) , p . 80 .

2

Convention , some of the Southern delegates , angered by the
civil rights plank established in the Democratic platform ,
walked out of the convention . 3

Truman's image was by and

large that of a well - meaning but bungling President , no
better qualified to discharge his duties as Chief of the
nation than the average man on the street .

Furthermore , his

simple , forthright and at times blunt manner alienated him
from many of the "powers that be" in the Democratic Party . 4
Thomas E. Dewey , his Republican opponent , was a young and
efficient politician who had given Franklin Roosevelt a "run
for his money" in the Presidential election of 1944 . 5 Henry
Wallace had been nominated as a Presidential candidate on the
Progressive Party ticket .

This party was expected to take

most of its votes from the Democrats . 6

All of the major

purveyors of predictions said that Truman did not have a
chance . ?

Yet in spite of the odds , Truman was re- elected to

the Presidency in 1948 .
3

Ibid .
411 The Democrats Have to be Progressive ," New Republic ,
CXIV (February 11 , 1946) , 88 .
5
"Republicans Start a New Political Era , " Life , XXI
(November 18 , 1948) , 31 .
6

York :
7

Rexford G. Tugwell , How T~ey Became President (New
Simon and Schuster ,-r964 , p . 437 .
Ibid ., p . 436 .

3

I.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was twofold.

First, an

effort was made to analyze all of the pertinent factors that
led to victory for Harry Truman and defeat for his major
opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, in the Presidential election of
1948.

Secondly, there was an attempt made to discern why

most of the media of prediction, including both amateur and
professional forecasters, predicted that Thomas Dewey would
win the Presidential election of 1948.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

History sometimes plays interesting tricks, and one
occurred when Harry S. Truman became President of the United
States.

Here was a man who did not want to be President,

for he himself said that he would have been happier serving
his country as a United States Senator. 8
Truman faced the most difficult of tasks, that of
attempting to fill the shoes of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Roosevelt was a man of great political powers (generally
conceded by both friends and foes) and a magnetic personality.

He had been at the nation's head for twelve

8Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Vol. II of
Memoirs. 2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 19,
43.

4

years, including in that time span most of World War II.
Truman was destined to be compared unfavorably to the
"Roosevelt legend."9
Under these circumstances, Truman began his task; and
for various reasons, by the year 1948, Truman was in trouble
politically speaking.

In fact, no one gave him very much

of a chance to win.10
III.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is important to historians in many ways.
(1)

Truman's victory in 1948 is considered one of the

biggest political upsets of all time.

The election of 1948

is unique in American history.

Never had so many been so
wrong about the outcome of a Presidential election. 11 This
uniqueness alone makes the study of the election significant.
(2)

After the 1948 election, a mass of material was devoted

to explaining why Truman won, where Dewey blundered, and why
9 Peter R. Levin, Seven £y Chance: The Accidental Presidents (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1948), pp.
265, 288.
10
"Mounting Troubles That Can Spell Defeat for Harry s.
Truman," United States News and World Report, XXIV (March
12, 1948), 34, 36; and "Fighter in a Fighting Year," Time,
LIII (January 3, 1949), 10-11.
11 "The Victorious Rebellion of Harry S. Truman," Newsweek, XXXII (November 8, 1948), 3-4.
----
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the polls were mistaken.

Most of these accounts were preju-

diced, and all lacked the partial perspective that the
passage of time can give.

One notable exception was the

report on the pre-election polls of 1948, prepared by the
Social Science Research Council, and even this report was
more hastily prepared than it should have been.

Since just

after the election, there has been very little significant
material written about the election.

It is recognized that

there have been many opinions, educated guesses, and
sweeping statements made about the election.

What is needed

is an objective synthesizing and sifting of facts in order
to discover exactly what happened in the Presidential
election of 1948.

(3)

Truman's victory in 1948 is a study

in masterful political campaigning, with an effective
knowledge of human nature thrown in.

Politicians and his-

torians can use this election as a casebook of human nature
and political maneuverability.
versial President.

(4}

Truman was a contro-

Whether he was a "great" President, a

mediocre one, or somewhere in-between, only time will tell.
This study should aid in the evaluation of Truman as a
person and President.

(5}

Thomas Dewey, Truman's opponent,

played a prominent role in American history for about ten
years.

Because of his prominence in the affairs of the

nation, a study would be incomplete without an analysis of

6

his role in the Presidential election of 1948.

(6)

The

terms ''public opinion" and "public opinion poll" have been
used for some time and seem to be here to stay.
are intangible and abstract at best.

These terms

However, by a study of

the election of 1948, the historian, sociologist, psychologist, and average person can increase their knowledge of
public opinion and improve the techniques of public opinion
polls.

Above all, the histQrian and all concerned should

get an idea of the usefulness of public opinion polls and
their future in the United States.
IV.

DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study did not include a description of Truman's
childhood years, or any of the formative period before he
became President of the United States (when he was Senator
and Vice President) unless it pertained to an analysis of
Truman as the political figure who was re-elected to the
office of President in 1948.

His decisions while President

and a general description of his tenure in office were
referred to only when the odds against Truman's victory in
1948 were cited.

His second term as President was not

studied at all, nor was his retirement from the Presidency
and subsequent life analyzed.

A detailed biographical

account of Thomas Dewey was not included in this study.

7

A brief resume of Dewey's political career prior to 1948 ,
and a more detailed account of his personality and tactics
were included in order to get a better perspective of the
election of 1948.

Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond , other

prominent Presidential candidates in 1948, were dealt with
only superficially , and then only in connection with the odds
against Truman ' s re- election , and in a statistical account
of the final outcome .

There was not a detailed analysis

(state by state) of the election results .

Only general

statements were made about particular areas of the United
States and their relation to the Truman victory.

A more

detailed study of the statistics presented by public opinion
polls was presented.

Only the factors deemed important to

the Truman victory and Dewey defeat were dealt with .

Impor-

tant factors such as personality traits of Dewey and Truman,
tactics of the two candidates , and the farm and labor vote
were dealt with in detail .

Public opinion polls were also

studied in detail , as well as other less scientific forms
of predictions , in order to determine why everyone predicted
a Dewey victory.

Through the study of the above- mentioned

factors , an attempt was made to find out exactly why Harry

s.

Truman was the victor in 1948 , after a near- unanimous

prediction of his defeat was made .

8

V.

COLLECTION AND TREATMENT OF DATA

Most of the information about the election of 1948 is
contained in periodicals and newspapers such as Time, Newsweek, U.

s.

News and World Report, and the New York Times.

Books such as the Truman Memoirs, biographies of Truman and
Dewey, and the Pre-election Polls of 1948 were studied.
This study consisted of five chapters.

Chapter II

studied the background of the election, including the death
of Franklin Roosevelt and its influence on the public's
attitude toward Truman, a detailed study of the Truman and
Dewey personalities, and a description of some of the odds
against Truman's being re-elected to the Presidency.

Chap-

ter III was a detailed account and analysis of the campaign
of 1948.

Chapter IV dealt with public opinion polls and

why they were wrong in their forecasts in 1948.

These were

dealt with from the standpoint of the average man, newspaper
reporters, magazine editors, politicians, the pollsters
themselves, and the Social Science Research Council.

Chapter

V gave the summary and conclusions gained from the study.
VI.
Public:

DEFINITION OF TERMS

In this study "public" was used as an intan-

gible term describing a cross-section of the people of the
United States.

9

Public Opinion:

"Public opinion is the aggregate

result of individual opinions--now uniform, now conflicting,
of the men and women who make up society or any group of
society." 12
The American Institute of Public Opinion:

This was

the nation's leading public opinion poll in 1948, as
organized by George Gallup.

This institute attempted to

analyze the election of 1948 and predict the outcome.
Upset:

A colloquial term meaning extreme deviation

from the norm.

12
Edward L. Bernap, Crystallizing Public Ofinion, (New
York: Liverwright Publishing Corporation, 1923 , p. 61.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE ELECTION
The troubles Harry S. Tr uman was to encounter in the
election of 1948 began on April 12 , 1945 , when it was
announced that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had died
of a cerebral hemorrhage in Warm Springs , Georgia .

Although

many people hated Franklin Roosevelt and critics were divided
as to whether or not he was a great President , he had guided
America

through twelve years of war and peace .

Because of

his oratory , charm , and shrewd political ability , he had
collected a large following by the time of his death . 1
Not only did Franklin Roosevelt have a large group of
followers , he had the political ability to unite both friends
and enemies in compromises .

An analysis of the Democratic

Party at the time of Roosevelt's death reveals a coalition
of New Deal liberals , Southern leaders who opposed many New
Deal measures , labor leaders sensitive about their position ,
and Midwestern farmers concerned about their own prosperity . 2
1R. Kent Fielding and Eugene E. Campbell , The United
States : An Interpretive History (New York : Harper and Row,
1964) ' p . 596 .
2
Gilman M. Ostrander , Profile History of the United
States (New York: McGraw- Hill , 1964) , p . 424 .
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Roosevelt ' s major group of followers , the New
Dealers , caused Truman considerable trouble in the campaign of 1948 .

This group , in collaboration with other

liberals , was partially responsible for the "draft Eisenhower 11 movement , the "Dixiecrat revolt , " and the Progressive
split in the pre- convention period and convention days of
1948.

Their attitude , whether intentional or not , was one

of scorn for Truman when he assumed the Presidency.

To

their way of thinking , no one could take the place of
Franklin D. Roosevelt , least of all a man as "average" as
Harry S . Truman .

They complained :

Now , if you can get in to see Truman at all you
have a feeling that he's just another government
official in just another government office . There's
no dazzle , no inspiration . Just apathy . You will
notice that people around Washington still mean
Roosevelt when they say 'the President;' they refer
to the present White House occupant as ' Mr . Truman . •3
Shortly after Truman became President , he reacted to
the attitude of Roosevelt's loyal supporters by firing many
of them.

Although he supported many policies of the New

Deal , bad feelings intensified and helped to explain the
311 The Cooling of the South ' s Anti - Truman Revolt,"
United States News and World Report , XXIV (May 21, 1948) ,
24; see Ernest K. Lindley , "Democrats and Desperation , "
Newsweek , XXXI (April 5 , 1948) , 19; and Jack Redding ,
Inside the Democratic Party (New York: Bobbs - Merrill Company , Inc ., 1958) , p . 191 .

12
disaffection of many of these liberals even after the Democratic Convention in 1948.4
Yet Truman's foremost problem when he assumed the
office of President of the United States had to do with his
public image.

In many ways he was the antithesis of Roose-

velt, who would have cast a large shadow over any successor.
In this case, the shadow was even deeper and darker because
of the contrast between Roosevelt and Truman.
attitude was expressed:

The public's

"President Harry Truman is not

Franklin Roosevelt, but he's the only President we have." 5
Early in Truman's first term of office, an ironical
change in public opinion became obvious.

His popularity at

one time, according to a Gallup poll, climbed to an eightyseven per cent approval rating.

Primarily, three reasons

accounted for this initial popular acceptance.
public saw Truman as "one of the people."

First, the

In this sense,

Truman brought the office of the Presidency closer to the
people.
way.

Second, Truman took office in an unpretentious

He promised to continue the policies of his prede-

cessor and not to "rock the boat."

The most important

4
"Mutineers and the Firm Hand," Newsweek, XXXII (July
26, 1948), 18.
5

"The Democrats Have to be Progressive," New Republic,
CXIV (February 11, 1946), 188.

13

reason , however, was that both leading political parties- out of respect for Roosevelt and because they realized the
handicaps his successor would have--paused to give the new
man time to establish himself in office .

Finally , the new

President was able to get along with Congress better than
Roosevelt had .

For this reason , Truman's first few months

in office gave the impression to most observers of being
successful ones . 6
The general acceptance of Truman did not last long.
Truman ' s homespun personality did not necessarily qualify
him for leading the nation •
• • • the plain people still liked Harry Truman
as a plain man , but he was not a President who
inspired their high confidence and enthusiastic
admiration • • • • A great many of the U. s. people
felt sorry for him . 7
The words honest and efficient used to describe
Truman when he entered office were later changed to bungling and inefficient .

People began to believe that

because of his humble attitude he was not qualified for
the office of President .

There were , however , more sub-

stantial reasons for belief that Truman was not qualified
6

Ernest K. Lindley , "Mr . Truman Under Fire , " News week , XXIII (February 25 , 1946) , 30 .
-7

"After One Year , " Time , XLVI (April 15 , 1946) , 19 .

14
to be President.

He began his political career at the age

of thirty-eight under the tutelage of Tom Pendergrast of
Kansas City.

From his post as county judge, he was promoted

by the party to the Senate where he acquired the reputation
of being a "yes man" in Congress.

On ninety per cent of

all legislation he voted straight New Deal.

The one

exception to his uncreative career as Senator was his
efficiency in handling what came to be known as the Truman
Committee. 8

Rather by accident, he was elected to the Vice

Presidency.

He was a compromise candidate who, because

he was a Southerner and because of his voting record in the
Senate (where he had managed to stay in the background and
follow), was considered harmless.

As President, a totally

new, active leadership was expected.
switch effectively.

At this time "
events; he did not lead them." 9

He could not make the
•• he (Truman) followed

Unqualified for the office himself, Truman appointed
old friends to high places in the government when he became
8A Senate committee of which Truman was chairman
which performed valuable service during World War II by
investigating corruption in government war contracts.
9
Harold J. Laski, "The American Political Scene,"
Nation, CLXIII (November 16, 1946), 550; Peter R. Levin,
Seven £y Chance: The Accidental Presidents (New York:
Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1948), pp. 280-286; and Robert
s. Allen and William W. Shannon, The Truman Merry-go-round
(New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), pp. 18-19.

15
President.

Many of these men were as unqualified for their

respective offices as Truman was fo r his .

The term "crony"

with all its derisive connotation became a popular way to
describe the Tr uman appointees .

Truman himself complained

of the incompetency of many of his appointees , but because
of loyalty to them he would not f i re them •
• • • a man any less stubbornly loyal to his
cronies might have decided that some friends were
more trouble than they were worth . This was one
decisi8n that Harry Truman seemed unwilling to
face . l
The result was confusion in the Government .

After a

short time in office , Truman tried to enact changes in the
Chief Executive office .
rapport with Congress .

He wanted to establish a personal
His plan included a "hands off"

policy to permit the nation ' s legislators more freedom .
The idea was a good one in theory , but was a failure in
application .

What the nation wanted was a man who could

implement his ideas .

What they wer e getting was a genial ,

har dworking man who had yet to become a leader others would
follow . ll
1011
A Little Mo r e Hectic , " Time , XLIV (Febr uary 18 ,
1946) ' 17.
ll
Avery Craven and Walter Johnson , The United States:
Experiment in Democracy (second edition ; New York: Ginn
and Company , 1962), p . 590 .

16
Harold Laski , leader of the British Labor Party at
this time , and a visitor to the United States in 1946 ,
described the nation under Truman ' s leadership :
To the foreign observer of the American scene ,
the outstanding characteristic of the landscape is
the absence of effective leadership . There is
nowhere any clear picture of direction . There is a
confused babble of noises from which emer ges no
decisive note. The White House may have the best
of intentions , but Americans watch it rather to see
the mistakes it will make than to hope for the
guidance it might offer . 12
Laski also criticized the President ' s relaxed atti tude toward his job , his penchant for selecting friends for
office and his obvious inexperience.
cutting one:

11

Laski's summary was a

President Tr uman is a weak President because

he has not the special kind of resolution which makes a
strong President ." 13
The overall picture one gets of Truman at this time
is that of a good- natured , muddling President incapable of
doing his job .

This image car ried over to the campaign of

1948; however , the picture was distorted .

Truman probably

saw himself more accurately than the pollsters did when ,
on the slip of his popularity rating to forty - eight per
cent in April of 1947 , he said :
12L as k1.
13

Ibid .

,

QQ. cit ., 548 .

"I never should have been

17
eighty-seven and I never should have been thirty-two. But
14
forty-eight isn't far off."
Truman was not yet an experienced hand at leading the nation, but he was far from the
incompetent bungler he was pictured as in 1947.
Several factors contributed to the distortion of the
Truman picture.

Truman's inexperience, coupled with his own

attitude, emphasized his inadequacies.

In a speech to the

people of Independence, Missouri, shortly after his accidental rise to the Presidency, he said:

"I shall attempt

• • • to meet your expectations, but don't expect too much
,,15
Of me.
Truman's image always suffered when contrasted with
Franklin Roosevelt who made Truman, in 1946, look like a
much poorer President than he was.

Truman keenly felt his

Presidential responsibility and was sensitive to critical
comparisons between himself and his predecessor.

The

result was a tension-ridden government that was expending
itself in petty quarreling, instead of focusing on the
business of running a nation.16
1411
Republican Honeymoon is Over," Fortune, XXXV
(April, 1947), 79.
1511
President After 52 Weeks, A Surer Man," Newsweek,
XXVII (April 15, 1946), 26.
16 Frank Friedel, America in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965T, pp. 484, 491-493.

18
The office of Chief Executive itself was undergoing
subtle changes at the time Truman was President.

The

experienced politicians, as well as the average person, had
held the office of the Presidency in awe during Roosevelt's
years in office.

Truman, however, worked toward bringing

the office of President of the United States down to the
people's level.

Truman succeeded.

to his own detriment.

In fact, he did the job

Much of Roosevelt's power had been

dependent on maintaining a respectable distance between
himself and the people.

Legislators, government officials,

and the common man respected Roosevelt and listened when he
spoke.

Truman lost this respect when he decreased the aes-

thetic distance between the office of President and the
level of the common man.17
Despite these distortions in the image Truman projected, the Democratic Party entered the Congressional
election of 1946 disorganized and with no recognized
leader.

The liberal factor of the party looked back to the

leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and mourned that there
was now no guiding influence in the White House.

Truman

had fired several of their number and seemed conservative
in comparison with their late, beloved leader. 18
17
18

Ibid.
Allen and Shannon, £2• cit., p. 25.

19
The Republicans took advantage of the Democratic
split, between the pro - Trumans and pro - Roosevelts, and
conducted an effective campaign.

Their slogan , coined by

a New England businessman , was "Had Enough?
lican!"

The people had "had enough . "

a change .

Vote Repub-

They were ready for

The result was an overwhelming victory for the

Republicans. 19
Ordinarily , the party in power experiences some slump
in midterm elections , but rarely has a political party been
so overwhelmingly repudiated at the polls as were the Demo crats in 1946.

They had been in power for fourteen years.

The average United States' citizen was war weary and took
this opportunity to vote against the political party that
had been in power during the war years .

Truman and the

Democratic Party were blamed for such things as labor
strikes , inflation , and poor diplomatic relations between
the United States and Russia.20

Added to the public dis -

content was the fact that the Democrats were fighting among
themselves and did not conduct an effective campaign in
1946 .
19
Hugh A. Bone , American Politics and the Party System
(New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company , Inc. , 1955) , p. 260;
and Leland Baldwin , The Stream of American History (New York:
American Book Co ., 1957) , pp . 736- 737.
2
°Cabell Phillips , The Truman Presidency (New York:
The Macmillan Company , 1966T; p . 160 .

20

The Republican victory in 1946 suggested that the
Republicans were about to become the party in power.

The

Republican-dominated Congress could establish national
policy during the next two years and have only token opposition.

Barring unforseen developments, a Republican would

be elected President of the United States.21

Few people,

Democrats or Republicans, doubted that the party switch was
probable.
The result of the Congressional elections of 1946 was
not, however, the disaster for the Democratic Party that many
thought it was.

Because he had felt the responsibility for

continuing to implement Roosevelt's New Deal programs (which
were not his own) , almost everything Truman attempted to do
was a dim carbon copy of his predecessor.

The party defeat

in 1946 was, to him, a repudiation of New Deal policies.
After the defeat, he felt that he was relieved of the
responsibility of continuing FDR's version of the New Deal.
Truman was forced to institute his own program.

For the

first time since entering office, Truman was able to take
the offensive.22

And, as he became more aggressive about

2111 Republicans Start a New Political Era," Life, XXI
(November 15, 1946), 31.
22
Allen and Shannon, Q£. cit., p. 30.

21
leading , the Truman victory of 1948 began to materialize .
In late 1947 he initiated final tactics that were to carry
him to victor y .
Clark Clifford , closest of Truman's advi sors , out lined in November , 1947 , what the new Truman emphasis should
be .

Clifford , with unusual political acumen , predicted that

Thomas Dewey would be Truman ' s opponent in the 1948 Presidential election , and that Henry Wallace would run on a
third party ticket .

Clifford erroneously calculated the

strength of the Dixiecrat revolt , but was accurate in his
other predictions .

He advised Truman to give top priority

in his political strategy to the farmers , to labor groups ,
to Negroes , and to Jews .

Truman should court the common

people because of his identity with them . 23
Truman took the experts ' advice under strong consideration , but he initiated some caution of his own .
image began to change.
Taft- Hartley bill . 24

Examples are abundant .

24

He vetoed the

He advocated and implemented a strong

stand on civil rights by the Democratic Party .
23

Truman's

He spoke

Phillips , 2£• cit ., pp . 197- 199 .

The Taft-Hartley bill was introduced by Congress
for two primary reasons . First , it was introduced to
redress the balance of bargaining between labor and manage ment by defining unfair labor practices for union as well as
employees . Secondly , it was to protect the individual
workers from arbitrary control of labor leaders .

22
in favor of price controls .

He pacified the Jews by a

quick recognition of the new nation of Israel .

It is sig-

nificant that all of these actions , except the Palestinian
question , became major issues in 1948 .

His strong stand on

civil rights precipitated the Dixiecrat revolt , but gained
votes from Negroes and Independents .

His stand on price

controls influenced many farmers , who would not otherwise
have done so , to cast their votes for Truman . 25
The Truman- Clifford strategy went almost undetected
by the professional pollsters and the general public , who
still evaluated Truman an ineffective President , the Demo cratic Party a decadent structure , and the chances of a
Democrat's being elected to the Presidency in 1948 as
practically nil . 26
True to Clark Clifford ' s prediction , however , the
Republicans in 1948 nominated Thomas Dewey as their Presidential candidate .

Since the early 1940's , Dewey's personality

traits had been emphasized by the press . 27

Dewey had a cold

personality , magnified by bad relations with newsmen .

York :

He

25Allen and Shannon , loc . cit.
26
Rexford Tugwell , How T~ey Became President (New
Simon and Schuster , 1964 , pp . 436-437 .

27Richard H. Revere , "Dewey: the Man in the Blue
Serge Suit , " Harpers Magazine , CLXXXVIII (May , 1944) , 482.

23
was impatient with reporters and attempted to use them
rather than to woo them.

As a result of his impoliteness,

newspapermen castigated him in print at every opportunity.
They called him "conceited," "superficial," "unnaturally
ambitious."

They concluded that he was not qualified to
become President of the United States. 28
In the Presidential campaign of 1944 (in which Dewey
ran against Franklin Roosevelt), the personality traits of
Dewey had been similarly attacked.

At that time, one news-

man said, ". • .not since Charles Evans Hughes has a
nominee crossed America and left such a chill behind him."29
Another, just as caustically, said, " • • • we just don't like
Dewey. This is about our worst charge.
. h • n30
f l.S

He is a cold

Several critics complained of Dewey's cliches like
"We shall have our freedom so long as we are are free.n31
28oswald Villiard, "Our Lack of Leadership," Christian
Century, LIX (September 25, 1942), 1083-4; see "Thomas E.
Dewey: The Man and His Record," New Republic, CXI (September 25, 1944), 387, 389; I. F. Stone, "Thomas E. Dewey:
Close-up of a Candidate, .. Nation, CLVIII (May 20, 1944),
586; and Rovere, QQ. cit., 484.
2911 Dewey Climaxes His Tour in Los Angeles," Life,
XVII (October 2, 1944), 35.
30 "We Take Our Stand,n New Republic, CXI (October
23, 1944)' 530.
31
Rovere, 2£• cit., 482.
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Stanley Walker, author of an obviously partisan book on the
life of Dewey, did not attempt to refute the evaluations of
Dewey's personality, but rather emphasized Dewey's efficiency as an off-setting quality for his poor personality.32
Even as early as 1943, the Dewey forces had begun
to revamp their leader's public image.

They needed to

shift the attention from Dewey's cold personality.

Dewey

himself relaxed and attempted to establish some rapport
with the press.

His best selling point was his record as

District Attorney of New York.

This was emphasized.

He

was billed as one of the most successful prosecuters in
New York history.33

He was projected as a successful gov-

ernor.
In three years as Governor (1943-45) he had
built up New York's cash surplus to a staggering
$500 million. In the election of 1946, Tom Dew~4
was re-elected by a whopping margin of 650,000.
He was called "· •• a quick, inquisitive, and forceful. • • man as ever lived. n 35
32Ernest K. Lindley, "Dewey, F. D. R., and the
Spoken Word," Newsweek, XXIV (July 10, 1944), 40.
33
rrving Stone, They Also Ran (New York: Pyramid
Books, 1943)' pp. 417-418.
34
Phillips, loc. cit.
35
Raymond Moley, "Dewey of New York," Newsweek, XXI
(March 29 ' 1943) ' 80 •
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His youth , and comparatively good showing against
Roosevelt in 1944 were alluded to as worthy .

His supporters

emphasized that:
• • • with his moderate reforms
vative financial policy, Thomas E.
to impress the country ' s voters as
not too liberal , governor , a sound
servative Republican . 36

and his conserDewey has managed
a liberal , but
but not too con-

By late 1947 , Truman was looking worse , being
compared with both Dewey and Roosevelt .
brilliant .

36

Dewey was efficient .

Roosevelt was

Truman was average .

"Election: Why Dewey Deserves the \tote , " Life ,
XVII (October 6 , 1944) , 34 ; see 11 GOP Jockeyings , ItTSJ'ust
Dewey vs. Wilkie , " Newsweek , XXIII (January 24 , 1944) , 39 ;
R. L. Buell , "Should Libe r als Vote For Dewey?" Life , XVII
(October 30 , 1944) , 60; Irving Stone , 2£• cit .,-p:-451;
and "Thomas Dewey Sticks to His Albany Knitting , " Life ,
XVI (March 20 , 1944) , 95 .
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CHAPER III
THE CAMPAIGN
The Presidential campaign of 1948 started on December
29 , 1947 in Chicago .

Henry Wallace , in an emotional , nation-

wide broadcast , announced that he would be the Progressive
Party's nominee for President of the United States .

He

stated in his announcement address that the two major political parties were tired and old -- the Republican Party being
hopeless 11 and the Democrats being saddled with a leader who
was driving the United States nearer to war with Russia . 1
11

The Wallace candidacy posed a serious threat to
Truman's re - election .

Wallace appealed to disillusioned

New Dealers and other liberals; and , in the early weeks
of 1948 , many of this group announced that they were supporting the Progressive Party.

Many columnists and political

experts predicted that Wallace would cost Truman the electoral
votes of important states such as New York , Illinois , and
California.
1
Cabell Phillips , The Truman Presidency (New York:
The Macmillan Company , 1966) , p . 201 ; and Samuel Eliot
Morrison , The Oxford History of the American People (New
York: Oxford University Press , 1965) , p . 1049 .
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However, as the campaign progressed, the influence of
the Wallace revolt was found to be less than originally supposed.

Although Henry Wallace was not a Communist, he would

not disavow Communist support.

However, it was soon dis-

covered that many of the people holding influential positions
in the Progressive Party were Communists.

This Communist

infiltration cost Wallace many liberal votes.

As a result,

when the final vote was counted, only a little over a million
people had voted for Wallace. 2
The main problem that the Progressive Party posed to
the Democrats throughout the campaign was that the Democrats
did not know whether Wallace would take enough votes away
from Truman to give the victory to Dewey.

This caused Truman

to be undecided as to whether he should concentrate verbal
ammunition on Wallace or leave him alone.

He finally decided
on the latter, which proved to be successful. 3
In addition to the Wallace defection, the Democrats
also had to deal with what came to be known as the Dixiecrat
2Charles A. Madison, Leaders and Liberals in 20th Cen~ America (New York:
Frederick Ungar Publishing ~--1961), pp. 445-446; Rexford G. Tugwell, How Th)y Became
President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964 , p. 436;
"Mounting Troubles That can Spell Defeat for Trumant" United
States News and World Report, XXXII (March 12, 1948), 34; and
Eric Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (second edition; New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 322-325.
3
Phillips, 2£. cit., p. 205.
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revolt.

Truman had consistently provoked Southern Democrats

since 1945 with his strong stand in favor of civil rights.
However, until 1948, Truman had only talked about what should
be done about discrimination against the Negro.

In February,

Truman issued a civil rights message asking for legislation
to end " • • • segregation and discrimination in the use of
transportation facilities by both public officers and the
employees of private companies throughout the country."

4

Southern reaction to Truman's message was quick and
decisive.

A six-man delegation headed by Strom Thurmond,

later to be nominated for President on the States Rights
ticket, went to Washington to confer with Democratic leaders
about the position of the party on the Negro.

Thurmond

asked Howard McGrath if he would use his position as National
Chairman of the Democratic Party to influence the President
to soften his stand on the civil rights issue.

McGrath

declined to do so and the Southern delegation went home completely defeated. 5
4

Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Vol. II of
Memoirs. 2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 181;
Thomas Bonner, Our Recent Past (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1965), p. 347; and V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in
State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 330.
5
Phillips, Q£. cit., p. 207; Jack Redding, Inside the
Democratic Party (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1958), p. 192; and "The Victorious Rebellion of Harry s.
Truman," Newsweek, XXXII (Nevember 8, 1948), 3.
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Frustrated because of their inability to achieve the
desired results , Southern leaders planned a meeting of delegates in Jackson on May 10 , 1948 , to discuss their strategy
for the coming campaign .

Delegates from only seven Southern

states attended , and results of the meeting were far from
satisfactory to many ardent segregationalist leaders .

How-

ever , this meeting was a step toward the organization that
was to take away thirty- eight electoral votes from the Democrats on election day . 6
Nation- wide reaction to the Truman stand on civil
rights was generally unfavorable.

David Lawrence thought:

Strong conservative support had already been given
to Mr . Truman from the Democratic South and there was
available to him a substantial conservative strength
of a liberal kind in the North among Independent
voters • • • • Mr . Truman , on the other hand , forfeited
the respect of the South by a message on 'civil
rights' • • • • Politically , it was a mistake for Mr .
Truman to try to curry favor with a 'left wing'
minority on this issue . For~ by doing so , Mr.
Truman lost the South • •• • t
At the Democratic Convention , held early in July,
the problem came up again .

Any chance for compromise or mol-

lification was ended when liberals--headed by Hubert Humphrey ,
mayor of Minneapolis - -held out for the adoption of a strong
6 Phillips , 2£· cit., p. 208 .
7 David Lawrence , "Poor Mr. Truman!" United States News
and World Report , XXIV (April 9 , 1948) , 37 .
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civil rights plank in the Democratic platform.

The liberals

won a trial vote on the issue and a portion of the Southern
delegation walked out.8
Democratic platforms since Roosevelt first ran for
President in 1932 had stated that the Democratic Party
believed in equal rights for Negro and white.

The difference

between 1932 and 1948 was that Truman actually intended to
enforce the civil rights plank in the Democratic platform.
After the Southern delegates had walked out of the convention,
one reporter said to Strom Thurmond:

"President Truman is

only following the platform that Roosevelt advocated."
"I agree," Thurmond replied, "but Truman really means it."9
The most damaging blow to Truman's re-election plans
came from the political bosses and leading liberals in his
own party.

After a Gallup poll in May which stated that the

Truman popularity had dropped to thirty-six per cent, many of
the leaders in the Democratic Party reasoned that with Truman
as their nominee it would be impossible for the Democratic
Party to win the Presidential election in 1948.

They franti-

cally began to search for another man to lead the party.

The

most obvious choice was General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
8
Redding, loc. cit.; and Phillips, 2£· cit., p. 219.
9

Truman, QQ. cit., p. 183.
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Ame r ica ' s most idolized war hero .

Jake Arvey , Jewish poli -

tical boss of Chicago , instigating the Ei senhower move , said ,
11

Come election time • • • I wi ll vote fo r • • • a man who can be

el ected .

I hope Gene r al Eisenhower becomes available . ulO

The "draft Eisenhower" moveme nt gr ew str onger despite
the fact that people did not know what Eisenhower stood for .
They only knew that they wanted a popular figure to replace
Tr uman .

Although Eisenhower had never taken an active part

in politics , and ther efor e knew little about such problems
as civil rights , labor , and other issues , many party leaders
were willing to tur n the reins of the party over to this
political novice because of his popularity .
A sizable cross section of the Democratic Party indi cated that they also would be in favor of a ticket led by
Eisenhower .

Among Ike ' s supporters were Elliott and James

Roosevelt , sons of the former President; Mayor Frank Hague
of Jersey City ; Leon Henderson , head of Americans for Demo cratic Action; Hugh Mitchell , Democr atic leader in the state
of Washington; Senator Claude Pepper of Florida ; Senator
Richard Russell of Georgia ; Governor A. B. (Happy) Chandler of
Kentucky ; Paul Douglas , Illinois candidate for Senator ; John
Bailey , State Chairman of Connecticutt ; Gover nor Jim Nance
1011 The Black and White Beans , " Time , LI (May 3 , 1948) ,
21; and "Panic , " Time , LI (April 5 , 1948) , 22.
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McCord of Tennessee; Mayor Edward Kelly of Chicago ; Mayor
William O' Dwyer of New York; Senators Lester Hill and John
Sparkman of Alabama; Hubert Humphrey , mayor of Minneapolis;
Walter Reuther of the CIO; Chester Bowles and Wilson Wyatt ,
who were also leaders in Americans for Democratic Action . 1 1
The consensus of political opinion was that no one
except for Eisenhower would have a chance to retain the Presidency for the Democrats.

Many felt that for the sake of

Senatorial , Congressional , and Gubernatorial candidates who
would lose votes if Truman ran , the President should step
down and let General Eisenhower or some strong candidate
take over .

One correspondent ' s remarks represented party

feeling :
President Truman cannot avoid being aware of the
open opposition to his renomination . It is doubtful ,
however, whether he realizes that almost nobody in his
party really wants him to run again • • • • This is not
because they think he is a weak candidate . He lacks
popular appeal , skill as a political manager , and
force as a leader . 12
During the "draft Eisenhower" movement , General Eisenhower maintained silence .

Claude Pepper , Senator from

1111 Democrats and Desperation , " Newsweek , XXXII (April
5 , 1948) , 19; Redding , QQ . cit. , p . 162; Phillips , 2£• cit. ,
pp . 210- 211; and Herbert Agar , The Price of Power (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press , 1957), p . 81 .
12
Ernest K. Lindley "Advice to the Democrats , " Newsweek , XXXII (July 12 , 1948} , 27 .
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Florida , wired the general two days before the Democratic
Convention and stated that the Democrats planned to nominate
Eisenhower with or without his approval .
11

Eisenhower stated:

I would refuse to accept the nomination under any conditions ,

terms , or premises . 111 3

This squelched the "draft Eisenhower"

movement and assured Truman of the nomination in 1948 .
Despite the dismal outlook in the preconvention days
of the campaign of 1948 and some opposition , Truman was
convinced that the people were still for him.

He set out to

prove where the public's sympathies lay by taking a "nonpolitical" tour across the nation in April of 1948 .

Truman's

stated purpose for the trip was to receive an honorary degree
from the University of California at Berkeley .

The actual

purpose of the jaunt was to give Truman a chance to speak
extemporaneously to the people of America and to test the
peoples' reaction to the Truman personality .

Most of his

speeches were given from the rear platform of a train in
such places as Pocatello, Idaho; Eugene , Oregon; Gary , Indiana; and Laramie , Wyoming .

The highlight of the tour came

when Truman reached Los Angeles .

Crowds estimated at more

than a million people jammed the parade route to catch a
glimpse of the President.
13

Although virtually ignored by

Phillips , QQ. cit ., p . 211 .
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most political observers, the people's reaction helped convince Truman that he should run for re-election, and set a
precedent for the famous "Give 'em Hell" campaigning by
Truman in the latter part of the 1948 campaign.

Senator

Robert Taft's complaint about Truman's "whistle stop" campaign actually helped Truman.

Not only was a new political

term coined, but Taft incited the ire of cities across the
United States who were not overjoyed at having their cities
called "whistle stops.u14
Shortly after Truman returned from his "non-political"
tour, the national political conventions began.

The Repub-

licans held their convention first at Philadelphia in June.
The three leading candidates were Robert A. Taft, Harold
Stassen, and Thomas E. Dewey.

Taft had the disadvantage of

being a leader in Senate at a time when the Republicans
were trying to disassociate themselves from the record of
the Eightieth Congress.

Stassen had been a sensation in

the early Presidential primaries but had incurred the wrath
of the Republican "Old Guard" by his unconventional tactics-such as entering the Ohio primary.
of Senator Taft.
E. Dewey.

Ohio was the horne state

The only remaining alternative was Thomas

Dewey was not very well liked, but his political

14 Ibid., pp. 211, 213-216.
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record was good.

Earl Warren, popular governor of Cali-

fornia, was nominated as Dewey's running mate.15
The Democrats moved into Philadelphia in July to hold
their convention.

One commentator described them as exci-

table, idealistic, and reckless when in convention assembly.
He said that they would rather fight among themselves than
with the enemy.

The 1948 convention was a unique one.

The

incumbent candidate for President was re-nominated, but with
extreme reluctance.

The atmosphere of the whole meeting was

that of gloomy resignation.

The delegates were resigned to

the unpleasant task of re-nominating a Presidential candidate who they felt could not possibly win.

Despite the

attempts of the Southerners, the liberals, the Wallacites,
and a gathering generally apathetic toward Truman, he won
the re-nomination on Wednesday, July 14.

Truman got 948

votes, while Richard Russell received the entire Southern
vote of 263.

Alben Barkley was nominated as the Democratic
Vice Presidential candidate. 16
15Hugh Bone, American Politics and the Pafty System
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955 , p. 261;
and Harvey Wish, Contemporar~ . America: The National Scene
Since 1900 (fourth edition; ew York: Harper and Row,
1966), pp. 662-663.
16
D. W. Brogan, Politics in America (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1954), p. 214; Ernest K. Lindley, "Democratic
Low Ebb,'' Newsweek, XXXII (July 9, 1948), 21; and Phillips,
QQ. cit., p. 221.
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The high point of the Democratic Convention came on
the last day .

Knowing that the convention was tired and

their spirits low, at 2 :00 in the morning Truman made what
has come to be one of the most famous acceptance speeches in
political history:
Senator Barkley and I will win this election and
make the Republicans like it , dont you forget
that • • • • Never in the world were the farmers • • •
as prosperous (as now) • • • and if they don't do
their duty by the Democratic Party they're the most
ungrateful people in the world • • • • And I'll say
to labor just what I ' ve said to the farmer . 17
He criticized the Eightieth Congress and the Republican
platform .

" · •• They promised to do in that platform a

lot of things I ' ve been asking them to do and that they've
refused to do when they had the power ."

The next point of

the speech was the surprising one -- i.e •
• • •On the twenty- sixth day of
in Missouri they call ' Turnip Day ,'
Congress back • . • • What that worst
does in its special session will be

July , which out
I'm going to call
80th Congress
the test . 19

The recalling into session of the Eightieth Congress
proved to be a master stroke of political maneuvering.

The

response of the tired delegates at the Democratic Convention
was tremendous.

The Democratic Party , almost politically

dead , lived and breathed again .

(Truman later admitted that

17 111 .
J.ne Squall ," Time , LIII (July 26 , 1948) , 14 .
18
Ibid .
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he knew that Congress could not pass many bills in a fifteenday special session.

He confessed that his idea of a special

session was a strictly political and partisan move calculated
to embarrass the Republicans).

Editorials across the nation

roundly denounced the recall, but it accomplished its purpose.

11

Turnip Day" focused the eyes of the nation on the

Republican "do nothing 11 Congress and set the stage for
Truman's whole campaign.l9
Even more important in Truman's campaign strategy than
his blasts at the Eightieth Congress was the personality of
Harry Truman.

As far back as 1947 a wise political observer

realized that:
The • • • biggest Republican problem is named Harry
Truman. This is a brand-new problem, so new that
some Republicans have not even heard of it as a problem.
Most Americans, in the days following the Republican triumph last fall would have laughed at the
thought that Mr. Truman could win the Presidency in
1948. Those who do not follow politics closely are
probably of this mind now. But the keenest G. 0. P.
leaders believe today, that, given a not impossible
set of circumstances, Harry Truman may be a hard man
to beat; and though they say this privately, they say
it in deepest sincerity.20
19

Phillips, QQ. cit., pp. 222-223; and Dexter Perkins
and Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The American Democracy: Its
Rise to Power (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964T: pp.
597-598.
2011
Republicans Honeymoon is Over," Fortune, XX.XV
(April, 1947), 77.
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Harry Truman sought to overcome a set of supposedly
impossible obstacles, with a campaign fitted around his
personality.

Because he was facing defeat and had only a

decadent Democratic organization, which had by and large
already given up, Truman had no choice but to wage a fierce
campaign.

He stayed on the offensive at all times, carrying

the fight to the Republicans in every way possible, capitalizing on mistakes and making political capital in any
way possible. 21
Many ridiculed Truman's conducting the "whistle stop"
type of campaign.

Truman traveled 22,000 miles to tell the

country what he believed in and why the people should not
vote Republican.

The trips were not dignified or organized,

but proved very effective.
to the people. 1122

"He personally carried his story

Truman's campaign began officially in Detroit on Labor
Day.

In the city of labor, Truman attacked the Republicans'

stand on labor, particularly their veto of the Taft-Hartley
21 "Long Shot That Won't Give Up," Newsweek, XXXII
(October 11, 1948), 26; and John A. Garraty, The American
Nation: A History of the United States (New York: Harper
and Row, 1966), pp. 806-807.
2 2w. McMillen, "Miracle of 1948, 11 Vital Speeches XV
(January 1, 1949), 182.
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Act.

Truman gave the impression that if Dewey were elected

President the labor cause would suffer a severe blow.23
Traveling into Iowa, farming country, Truman described
the Republicans as primarily concerned with big business
and accused the Republicans of betraying the American
farmer.

He cited the fact that the farmers had no place

to store their grain and thus were forced to sell their
grain below the support price because they had no place to
store it.

For this, they could thank the same Republican

Congress. 24
So it went across the country.

At the end of the

first ten-day jaunt across the country, Mr. Truman's advisors
believed that they had made some progress.

They also thought

Truman had set a background for strategy that would pay off
later.

They felt that Truman had connected Dewey suffi-

ciently with the troubles of the Eightieth Congress.

They

also felt that sooner or later Dewey would have to reply to
the Truman charges and that this would be to the advantage
of the Democrats.25
And so the Truman cavalcade went rocketing up and
down the land, laying down a barrage of political
23 Phillips, QQ. cit., p. 232.
24
Ibid., p. 236.
25
News item in the New York Times, October 3, 1948.
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hyperbole , accusation and ridicule . Much of it was
nonsense and some of it was shameful , but there was
a seed of truth in most of what he said and an e~g 
ment of low- keyed heroics in the way he said it.
Truman even intensified his attacks on Dewey and the
Republicans .

In Wilmington , Delaware , on October 6 , Truman

exclaimed:
Herbert Hoover once ran on this slogan: ' Two cars
in every garage .' Apparently the Republican candidate
this year is running on the slogan : ' Two families in
every garage . • 27
In Philadelphia on the same day , he attacked Dewey ' s unity
theme :

"We believe in the unity of free men .

the unity of great causes .

We believe in

We don ' t believe in the unity of

slaves or the unity of sheep being led to slaughter . "28

At

Rochester on October 8 , Truman attacked the Republican Party :
"The leopard has not changed his spots --he has merely hired
some public relations experts ." 29

In St . Paul Truman

attacked the '' me too " attitude of the Republicans:

" · •• The

American people should consider the risk of entrusting their
destiny to recent converts who come along and say , ' Me too ,

26Phillips , Q£ . cit ., p . 241 .
27«By Harry S . Truman : Campaign Barbs That Won The
Votes • • • , " Newsweek , XXXII (November 8 , 1948) , 4 .
28Ibid .
29Ibid .
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but I can do better .' " 30

At Johnston , Pennsylvania , Truman

taunted the Republicans :

"GOP these days means just one

thing:

' Grand Old Platitude .' 11 31
Truman continued his attack on the campaign tactics

of the Republicans in Pittsburg on October 23 :

"This soft

talk and double talk • • • proceeds upon the assumption that
you can fool the people --or enough of them-- all the time . n32
Finally , in Brooklyn on October 29 , an optimistic Truman
said:

"I have good news for you .

We have the Republicans

on the run • • • • We are going to win . u33
The zenith in Truman ' s campaign speeches was reached
in his last one which was broadcast to the nation from St .
Louis , Missouri on October 29 .
achievements .

In it , he emphasized his own

He referred to his bringing the war to a

successful conclusion , and his support of the founding of
the United Nations .

He then stressed that the major asset

of the Democratic Party was that it was a peoples ' party .
He pointed to New Deal reforms which were enacted for the
30

Ibid ., pp . 4- 5; and Leland Baldwin and Robert Keeley,
The American Nation (third edition; New York: American Book
Company , 1965) , p . 748 .
3111 Campaign Barbs That Won the Votes • • • , " oo . cit .,
5.

__._

32
Ibid .
33
President Truman ' s St . Louis Address , New York
Times , October 29 , 1948 .
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benefit of the common man as proof .

Again , as in other

speeches prior to this one , Truman appealed to the farmer :
"And I ' ll say to you that any farmer who votes against his
own interests , that is , who votes the Republican ticket
ought to have his head examined ." 34
In the same speech he spoke of the Republican stand
on labor , specifically the Taft-Hartley Act .

The apathetic

labor turnout at the polls in 1946 was responsible for the
passage of the Taft- Hartley .

If labor did not get behind

the Democratic ticket in 1948 , the same thing could happen
again . 3 5
Warming to his task , Truman attacked Thomas Dewey ,
his opoonent , and the Eightieth Congress , also his ooponent .
Of all the fake campaigns this is the tops as
far as the Republican candidate for President is con cerned . He ' s been following me up and down the
country making speeches about home and mother and
unity and efficiency and things of that kind . 36
Then , switching to give equal attack to his other opponent ,
he said :

11

It has worked for the lobby , the worst lobby out-

fit that there ' s ever been in the history of the United
States . "37

3 4 Ibid .
35 Ibid .
36 Ibid .
37Ibid .
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At the end of the speech , he described the great
reception he had received in every city in which he had
visited:
People are waking up, the tide ' s beginning to
roll, and I'm here to tell you that if you do your
duty as citizens of the greatest republic the sun
has ever shone on , we 'l l have a Government that ' ll
be for your interests, that'll be for peace in the
world , and for the welfare of all the people and not
just a few . 38
Truman ' s acid oratory had incisively exposed the
weaknesses of his opponent and his ability to identify with
"the people .n 39
The tactics of Thomas Dewey were exactly the opposite
of Truman 1 s .

He decided not to "rock the boat . 11

He said

nothing controversial , and his speeches were full of plati tudes.

The core theme of Dewey ' s speeches was unity ,

a sufficiently safe theme :
From the Atlantic to the Pacific and back
again • • . Dewey racked up 16 , 000 miles of campaigning , but the speech delivered at each stop
carried the same burden : 1 We are entered up~n a
campaign to unite America . We are going to move
forward to a new unity.'40
A classic example of a Dewey speech was given early in
October at Salt Lake City .

He opened with a platitude:

"We

38Ibid .
3 9Ibid .
40Louis B. Wright and others , The Democratic Experience (Chicago: Scott , Foresman and Company , 1963) , p . 435 .
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will wage peace , we will wage peace with all the vigor and
the imagination and the skill with which we waged war.n4l
After this , he promised to :
(2)

(1)

support the United Nations;

aid freedom- loving people everywhere; (3)

European nations to unite; (4)

encourage the

remain strong and get

stronger ; (5) continue to be a flourishing and vigorous
nation; and , (7)

express in the American foreign policy the

"ideals , traditions , and aspirations of the American
people . " 42
As Dewey entered the last week of the campaign, he
too was extremely confident of winning .

On a last campaign

trip to the East he campaigned more for Republican Senators ,
Congressmen , and Governors than for himself .

Returning from

that last trip , he stayed at home for the final week .
was silent and sure of victory . 4 3

He

Immediately before the election , Dewey declared that
the paramount issue of the campaign was whether the United
States would be a strong , united nation able to meet "the
challenge of a dangerous world . "44

Above all other objectives

41

Governor Dewey ' s Salt Lake City Speech , New York
Times , October 1 , 1948 .
42
Ibid .
4311 Coasting , " Newsweek , XXXII (November 1 , 1948) , 19 .
44Dewey's Speech on the Eve of Election , New York
Times, November 1, 1948.
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was the building of " a lasting peace in the world upon the
work of justice and decency . 1145

Dewey closed his campaign

as he had begun it--with a "give 'em unity" speech .
Dewey was given , throughout his campaign , the overwhelming support of the newspapers across the nation .

Even

from Truman's home state of Missouri , three major newspapers ,
the St . Louis Post - Dispatch , the St . Louis Times , and the
St . Joseph News - Press (all of which favored Roosevelt in
1944) , supported Dewey in 1948 .

The New York Times , gener-

ally conceded to be the nation ' s leading newspaper , came out
for Dewey .

The New York Post decided that Truman's election

was undesirable .
the nation .
Truman.

Opinions similar to this existed across

Many Southern journals were expected to oppose

A few went even further and supported Dewey .

"In

contrast to the President's ill fortunes , Dewey had not
suffered ~ single newspaper defection . 1146
Most of the papers supported Dewey reluctantly , professing to believe that Truman could not measure up to the
rigorous demands of being an effective President .

One

consolation for Truman , however , was that the President made
the headlines with his sensational blasts at Dewey and the
45
46

Ibid .

"Seldom an Encouraging Word , " Newsweek , XXXII
(November 1 , 1948) , 11 .

46

Republican Party.

Dewey, on the other hand , proceeded in

his calm campaign , notable for its lack of headline mater. 1 • 47
1a

Not only did Truman have newspaper troubles throughout
the campaign , but he also lacked money to finance his campaign.

The regular Southern contributors , labor unions,

wealthy New Dealers , Hollywood backers , and wealthy individuals were reluctant to give money to a controversial , if not
lost , cause. 48
Examples of Democratic financial difficulties in 1948
are many .

On one occasion , $100 , 000 was needed to pay NBC

and CBS for network time .

The deadline came and the party

treasury contained only $500 .

The Democrats gave Warwick

and Legler , a New York agency , a check for $100 , 000 late
Saturday.

In turn , Warwick and Legler gave their check to

the television networks too late to be deposited on Saturday .
By Monday, the Democrats had raised the $100 , 000 .

At one

time the Truman whistle - stop campaign ran out of money in
Oklahoma City .

Several rich oilmen had to be called on to

47 Ibid .
48 Ernest Lindley , "Democratic Low Ebb , " 212.· cit . , 21;
and Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch , American and World Leadership (New York : Appleton- Century-Crofts , 1965) , VI, 103 .

47
keep the "Truman express" going.

On another occasion, Truman

was cut off the air by the television networks because no
money was available to pay for overtime.49
Added to the discouraging factors discussed was the
fact that the three public opinion polls unanimously predicted
that Truman could not possibly be re-elected. 50 The May tabulation has already been discussed.

At that time, according

to Gallup, only thirty-six per cent of the voters were for
51
Truman.
In April, Newsweek had conducted a less than scientific survey of the Senate.

Thirteen senators were committed

against Truman, twenty-six more were uncommitted, and only
six were definitely for him.52

Several magazines discounted

future issues and referred to the Governor of New York as
53
"President Dewey."
One outstanding example of this was
Life magazine's caption of November 1, where under a picture
Dewey boarding a ferry boat, Life said:
49

"The next President

Jack Redding, £2• cit., pp. 235, 273, 289.

50Rexford Tugwell, QQ. cit., pp. 436-437.
5111 Black and White Beans," QQ. cit., 21.
52
"Democrats and Desperation," loc. cit.
53 Lamont Buchanan, Ballot for Americans (New York:
E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 141, 143.

48
travels by ferry boat over the broad waters of San Fran.

Cl.SCO

B ay . u54

The three major scientific polls of prediction
forecast a Truman defeat .
three nation - wide surveys.

Archibald Crossley published
One was conducted between August

6- 15 , another between September 13- 20 , and a final one
between October 11- 18.

The composite in percentage showed

46 . 8 per cent of the people were for Dewey , while 43 . 6 per
cent were for Truman , with the other votes distributed
between Thurmond , Wallace , and the other minor candidates . 55
In two Gallup surveys- - one conducted between October
6- 20; the other was completed between October 15- 29-- the
results of the first showed 1 , 186 for Dewey (thirty- eight
per cent) to 969 (thirty- one per cent ) for Truman.

The

second showed 1 , 175 for Dewey (forty per cent) and 964 for
Truman (thirty- two per cent) • 56 George Gallup , the most
influential of the three major pollsters, had asked the
voters :

"If the Presidential election were held TODAY , how
54

Ibid.

55 Frederick Mosteller , The Pre - election Polls of
1948 (New York: Social Research Council, 1949), pp. 319324 .
56
Ibid.

49
would you vote--for Dewey, for Truman, for Wallace, for
57
Thurmond?"
to get the results indicated.
Elmo Roper, another leading pollster, conducted four
major forecasts.

Between July 19-23, the results were 31.5

per cent for Truman, 46.3 per cent for Dewey.

Between

August 2-7, Truman had 31.4 per cent, Dewey 44.2 per cent.
Between September 15-18, Truman received 29.7 per cent,
Dewey 47.9 per cent.

His last poll, conducted between

October 25-28, found Truman with 32.9 per cent to Dewey's
43.3 per cent.58
The last published prediction came when the New York
Times put out an electoral map projecting the outcome of the
election.

The Times predicted that Dewey would get 345

electoral votes to Truman's 105.
38.

Forty-three votes were in the

Thurmond would receive
11

doubtful 11 column.59

To help sustain this aura of psychological defeat
for Truman, there were two political maxims that had stood
the test of years.

One, popularly known as Farley's Law,

declared that the minds of the voters were made up six
months before the election, and that political campaigning
57
58
59
1948.

Ibid., p. 344.
Ibid., pp. 344-347.
Pre-election Forecast, New York Times, October 31,
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was strictly a ceremonial function. 60

The other maxim was

that no political party could remain in power indefinitely.61
According to political experts, these two laws predetermined
Truman's defeat.
Truman's election in 1948 was, therefore, one of the
most stunning upsets in history.

When the votes were tabu-

lated, Truman had a popular vote of 24,104,836 (49.5 per
cent) and an electoral vote of 304.

Dewey had a popular vote

totaling 21,969,500 (45.1 per cent) and an electoral vote
of 189.

Thurmond received 1,000,000 votes and the other

38 electoral votes.62
The results were in, but the questions had just
begun.

Why had Truman won despite sure defeat?

There were

many factors contributing to Truman's victory, several of
them important.
ality.

There was, first of all, the Truman person-

Everything focused on this as the major explanation

for the victory.

Had Truman been less persevering, less of

a fighter, he would have given up early in the campaign.
One hardly becomes a homespun, courageous sensation overnight.
60

Mosteller, 22· cit., p. 355.

61
62

Buchanan, QQ. cit., p. 141.

Associated Press Statistics on the 1948 Presidential
Election, .New York Times, December 11, 1948.
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The qualities which were the winning ones were not newly
developed by Truman .

As early as 1945 people noticed that

he was easy for them to identify with .
II

They said that he

. • instinctively thinks , feels , and acts like the average

American . u63

His courage and recuperative powers combined

with his blunt , simple style of oratory are the personality
characteristics which resulted in victory in 1948:
He set out to 'tell the people the facts .' He was
no orator; he stumbled over big words • • • • But Harry
Truman succeeded in dramatizing himself; to millions
of voters he seemed a simple , sincere man fighting
against overwhelming odds • • • • Few men have been able
to communicate their personality so completely . He
never talked down to his audience . He showed no
shadow or pompousness . • • • They knew just how he
felt.64
The average man made further comment: 11 • • • Truman
65
was for us poor people ."
Others spoke of Truman as the
underdog:

"You got to remember he was the underdog .

like in American sports .

It was

You always root for the little guy

who's getting a pushing around from the big one .n 66

Truman's

63Quote from the New York Times and New York Herald
Tribune , October 31 , 194s;-and "Congress and President Truman
March Forward ," The Congr·essional Digest , XXIV (June , 1945) ,
161.
64
"Fighter in a Fighting Year ," Time , LIII (January 3 ,
1945) ' 64 .
65
"Truman--Reasons for Victory," New York Times Magazine, XCVIII (November 28 , 1948) , 1 , 63 .
66 Meyer Berger , "Reasons for Victory ," New York Times ,
November 4 , 1948 .
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affiliation with the average man can be summed up in this
way:

"President Roosevelt used to talk about the common

man--but President Tr uman is a common man ." 67

This asset

was invaluable in the campaign of 1948 .
Howard McGrath , in a post- election statement , almost
discounted the Truman personality as a reason for his vic tory .

He felt that the problems inside the Eightieth Congress

had caused the victory :
The Republican Eightieth Congress may well have
been the deciding factor in the election • • • • With out the performance of the Republican Congress ,
Dewey might possibly have been electect . 68
Although McGrath was generalizing his statement , there was
an element of truth in it .

An important tactic of the Truman

strategy was connecting Dewey with the record of the Eightieth Congress .

Truman hit hard at the Congress .

The fact

that he had controversial issues to attack also made his
campaign more telling . 6 9
Another important factor in the Truman victory was
his opponent's campaign .
67

In a press conference after his

Ibid .

68
Howard McGrath ' s Comments , New York
1 , 1948 .
69
Roper Still Seeks Answers on Polls ,
November 8 , 1948 ; Redding , 2£· cit ., p . 184;
Reasons for Victory , " loc . cit ., and "Truman
York Times , November 7 , 1948 .

Times , November
New York Times ,
"Truffian:Sweep ," New
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victory , Truman was awar e that the Republican Par ty's blunder s had helped him and brought down the house by saying
that he thought his opponent was the greatest asset he had . 70
This , of cour se , was an over- simplification used for humorous
effect , but there was an element of truth in the statement .
Some Republicans thought that Dewey would have done better
if he had not depended on a small gr oup of Albany politicians
to do his thinking for him .

These men believed a profes -

sional politician such as Robe r t Taft would have done a
better job .

Truman ' s reiteration of New Deal policies was

also cited as a reason for h i s victory .

People complained

of the Dewey personality , Republican over- confidence , the
failure of Republicans to vote , and the " smug , supercillious
campaign" conducted by the Republicans . 7 1
Governor Dewey himself blamed as a major factor in his
defeat over confidence and failure among many Republicans to
vote because they thought him a certain winner . 72
70
Arthur Krock , "Why Dewey Lost , " New York Times
November 12, 1948 , p . 22 ; and V. 0 . Key , Jr ., Politics ,
Parties , and Pressure Groups (fifth edition; New York:
Thomas J . Crowell Company , 1964) , p . 484 .
71
Robert G. Whalen , "Our Forecast : What Went Wrong?"
New York Times , November 7 , 1948; "Tr uman--Reasons for Vic tory ," loc . cit .; and Thomas A. Bailey , The American Pagenat
(second edition; Boston : D. C. Hearst and Co ., 1962) , p . 922 .
72
Buddington Kelland , Comments on the 1948 Election ,
New York Times , November 16 , 1948 .
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Statistics showed huge contrasts in the amount of time and
energy each candidate spent getting votes.

Dewey campaigned

for six weeks, made 110 speeches, and covered 16,000 miles
on his campaign trail.

Truman campaigned for eight weeks,

made 271 speeches, and covered 22,000 miles in his campaign.
Truman's hard work paid off.73
Whatever can be said about Republican tactics during
the campaign, it is evident that the Dewey failure in 1948
was due partially to the Republican Party's failure to use
the issues of the day to its advantage, and the evidence of
a general apathy toward the election among many Republican
voters. 74
The personalities of Dewey and Truman were definitely
a factor in the campaign, but it is difficult to measure
precisely how much the personality traits and tactics were
responsible for the Truman victory.

A more concrete evi-

dence of victory can be seen in the influence labor had in
in the 1948 campaign.

President Truman had one explanation

that was obviously a generalization, but significant nonetheless.

He said:

" • . • L a b or d"d
1
1"t •

•

•

•

t~75

Labor

73Raymond Moley, "Presidency," Newsweek, XXXII ( November 17, 1948), 16.
74
"The Republic: For Once Without Shouting," Newsweek,
XXXII (November 8, 1948), 22-23.
75

Truman Sweep, loc. cit.
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resented the Taft- Hartley Act .

Truman had vetoed the Act .

Therefore , America ' s working man in the long run voted for
Truman despite the fact that he did not think Truman could
win .

Labor members turned out in large numbers to vote

against the Taft - Hartley Act , and in the process helped
carry Truman into office . 76
In assessing the results of the 1948 election , one
farmer said :

"I wasn't voting for a man or a party .

voting for the price of wheat . 11 77

I was

This farm vote was another

important factor in the Truman victory .

The farmers were

content to stay with an administration that had been good to
them rather than to risk their prosperity on a gamble with
the Republican Party:
The farmers balanced the gains they had made
under the Democratic administration against Dewey's
promises . In the struggle between their pocketbooks
and their ingrained conservatism , their pocketbooks
won out. Dewey's margin in the farm areas was too
slim to carry him to victory.78
7611
Truman--Reasons for Victory , " loc. cit.; "Fighter
in a Fighting Year , " loc . cit.; and "By Harry Truman: Campaign Barbs That Won the Votes • • • , " 2.£ · cit. , 5.
7711 Fighter in a Fighting Year , " loc. cit .
78
"Significance of the 1948 Campaign , " Newsweek, XXXII
(November 8 , 1948) , 7; "Fighter in a Fighting Year," loc .
cit.; "Truman Sweep , " loc . cit . ; "By Harry Truman: Campaign
Barbs That Won the Votes • •• , " loc . cit . ; and Samuel
Lubell , The Future of American PoTitics-TNew York: Harper
and Brothers , 1951) --,pp . 160 - 161 .
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A final factor in the victory need only be mentioned
briefly.

Three states , Ohio , Minnesota, and Illinois, held

the balance of the election .

Were it not for the sweeping

victories of Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio , Senator Hubert
Humphrey of Minnesota, and Senator Paul Douglas and Governor
Adlai Stevenson of Illinois , all of Truman's hard work plus
the labor and farm vote might not have been enough to win
the election . 79
It is evident that there was no one reason for Truman's victory .

There were several , including Dewey's

personality , Truman's effective campaign , and the ability
of Truman to garner a large part of the farm and labor
vote .

79

Truman Sweep , loc . cit.

CHAPTER IV
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND THE ELECTION
When the reasons for the Truman victory were formulated, only half the picture of the 1948 Presidential
election was completed.

If possible, the question, "how

could everyone, amateur and expert alike , be so unanimous
in their prediction of defeat for Harry Truman in 1948?"
must be answered in order to understand the election of 1948.
The press played a large part in the prediction of
Truman's defeat.

The New York Times made a comprehensive

survey on the eve of the election and forecast an overwhelming electoral victory for Dewey .

After the election

proved it wrong, the Times attempted to explain why its
prediction had erred .

One reason the correspondents missed

on their prediction was because they listened to the oldline political experts in the various states.

These

politicians had followed elections for years, and almost
without exception , these men predicted a Dewey victory .
The correspondents took the views of these "old pros" at
face value, without attempting to investigate the matter
for themselves .

Many of the Times correspondents decided

that if the Democrats did not think they could win, then
there must be no hope for a Truman victory.
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Not only did many correspondents accept the views
of the politicians, they spent too much time talking among
themselves.

All that this accomplished was the solidification

of preconceived opinions.

They did not spend time asking the

people what they thought about the election because the correspondents had their minds made up in advance.

Likewise,

they dismissed the large crowds that attended Truman's
speeches as curiosity seekers.

The correspondents spent

their time in the office when they should have been out
among the people.1
The correspondents manifested almost identical political tendencies; therefore, they failed to make a correct
forecast in 1948.

Tradition indicated that no party could

stay in office forever.

Many correspondents believed that

the odds had finally caught up with the Democrats, and the
belief was strengthened by the might of the GOP trend (which
had begun in 1938 and had been carried to its apex in the
1946 Congressional elections).

Most political experts

believed that the Democrats had suffered such crushing defeat
in 1946 that they could not possibly win in 1948.

They

pointed to the vote-getting power of Dewey (23,000,000
1

Robert G. Whalen, "Our Forecast:
New York Times, November 7, 1948, p. 4E.
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popular votes) in 1944 against Roosevelt as compared to
Truman's declining popularity and utter lack of political
influence evidenced in the 1946 elections.

Reporters in

several states based their predictions on traditional GOP
strength, or on controversial regional contests that were
supposed to bring out the Republican vote.

Many thought

that Dewey was so strong that he could carry himself and
many weaker GOP candidates to victory.2
The press went wrong also, in that it depended as
heavily on the public opinion polls.

The Times correspon-

dents, instead of interviewing people, quoted statistics
as compiled by the leading polling organizations.3

Scien-

tific opinion polls had enjoyed twelve years of unchallenged
success and had come to be regarded as practically infallible.

Congressmen, reporters, magazine editors, and the

average man-in-the-street depended upon the polls to do
their political thinking for them.

The scientific polls

were supposed to be much more reliable than the "amateurs."
Yet Gallup, Roper, and Crossley did no better th an the
press or any other amateur forecaster.
By 1948, the art of polling had been taken out of
the hands of the pollsters.
2
3

Ibid.
Ibid.

Instead of objectively trying
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to report statistics, the polls had become involved in a mad
race conducted by the news media to get a "beat" on how
the election was going to come out.

There was a danger of

vested interests taking over polling and using it for some
selfish end.

Because of their probable misuse, many people

believed that all sorts of public forecasts should be eliminated as a possible danger to the legitimate use of the
powers of persuasion. 4
If a large part of the responsibility for the predicted
defeat for Truman in 1948 can be traced to the opinion polls,
a short history of the polls themselves will cast some light
upon the reasons for their failure.

First, the scientific

public opinion polls were not initiated to predict elections,
but rather to help companies to sell their products.

Before

the polls, companies used a process known as market analysis
in which process a manufacturer who wanted to test public
reaction to a new product paid representatives to go out and
ask people about their reaction to the product.

This method

was unwieldy and expensive, and attempts were made to discover an easier and cheaper way to find out the public's
opinion about certain products.

They discovered that one

hundred people in a certain income bracket living in ten
cities could be sampled easier than one thousand people in
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one city , and that the results were more conclusive .

Dr .

George Gallup and Elmo Roper , both pioneers in this process
which came to be known as "quota sampling , " became directors
of prosperous institutes of research .
As practiced by the pollsters , the process of quota
sampling involved four basic steps.

(1)

It was necessary

that the sample be typical of the area where the polling was
being done .

(2)

The population in the area polled was

divided into categories -- age , religion , race , education ,
social levels , and economic status .

It endeavored to be

representative of all the factions within a community .
Even though only a small number of persons were polled in
quota sampling , they adequately represented the majority of
people in the area , if the sample was properly conducted .
(3)

Interviewers contacted the selected representative

individuals within a specific environment .

They used ques -

tions prepared in advance by the sponsoring organization ,
i . e ., Gallup , Roper , or Crossley .
selves were not full time

The interviewers them-

e~ployees .

They were temporary

employees who received approximately eighty- five cents an
hour for their job .

They generally came from a middle class

environment and included a cross section of professional
workers- - teachers , reporters , and lawyers .

Their training

usually consisted of on - the - job supervision for a short

62
period of time.

Gallup's organization had one thousand

three hundred interviewers, Roper's two hundred fifty-six.
The average interview lasted from ten to fifteen minutes.
(4)

The preparation of questionnaires and their subsequent

evaluation was the most crucial part of the process.

The

questions asked had to be tactful, economical, and yet able
to elicit the proper responses.

When these four steps were

completed, the data had to be processed, evaluated, and
publicized. 5
The pollsters turned to election forecasting in order
to have a national testing ground for various sampling methods.

They enjoyed immediate success.

In the Presidential

elections of 1936, 1940, and 1944, they successfully predieted the winning candidates.

Because of this success,

the public opinion polls came to be known as scientifically
reliable.6
The election of 1948 exposed the pollsters as vulnerable in several ways despite the number of people
interviewed.

In a two-month period before the 1948 elec-

tion, Dr. Gallup interviewed over 60,000 people.

Roper's

organization simultaneously conducted 5,200 interviews.
5
Cabell Phillips, "And the Polls:
New York Times, November 7, 1948, p. 4E.
6 Ibid.
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After the election , the pollsters immediately began to
re- evaluate their method of quota sampling .
interpretation of why they failed in 1948 .

They had their
First , all of

the polls were confro nted with a per centage of people who
answered certain questions "undecided" or "no opinion . "
This type ranged from eighteen per cent to seven and one- half
per cent in the campaign of 1948 .

The pollster s decided

because of previous experience with the "undecided" to dis tribute their theoretical vote among the candidates .

This

was a highly unscientific process at best , involving guess work and a naive belief that the people with "no opinion" or
people "undecided'' about how to vote would divide proportion ately with those who expressed definite opinions .

They also

knew that they had miscalculated the "intensity" of the
voters .

(Until some method is devised to measure the degree

of determination of the voter to carry through a stated
course of action , the polls will be an unreliable indicator
of public opinion) .

Interviews were weak .

process in polling broke down at this point .

The scientific
Both the inter-

viewer and the one interviewed were human and , therefore ,
subject to prejudice .

Also , the average interviewer was

only casually trained for his job and was allowed a broad
area of discretion in choosing whom he would interview .

He

tended to interview people from his own class and therefore
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fails to get an adequate cross section of beliefs and ideas
from which come scientifically interpreted results .
Margin of error (four per cent) is but arbitrarily
designated by the pollsters.

In a close election it is

almost impossible to accurately predict the winner .
result is , at best , only guesswork .

The

In the 1948 election

the margin of error was even more than four per cent as
indicated by the chart below :

Truman
Dewey
Wallace
Thurmond

Gallup

Roper

Crossley

Ave .

Voters

44 . 5
49 . 5
4.0
2. 0

37 . 5
52. 8
4. 4
5. 3

45 . 0
50 . 1
3.3
1.6

42 . 3
50 . 8
3. 9
3.0

50 . 0
45 . 6
2. 4
2.0

% of

Error
18.1
10 . 1
39.2
33.2
7

It is now evident that seemingly irrelevant factors
can profoundly affect a Presidential election.

An example

of an outside factor is the birth control issue in Massa chusetts which brought out many Irish- Catholic , Democratic
voters who might otherwise have stayed at home .

Intangible

factors such as apathy on the part of Republican voters and
renewed determination to

11

go down fighting 11 by the Democrat

organization , affected the 1948 campaign in a significant
way , yet could not be predicted in advance .
7

The conclusions

Harold Isaacs , "How , Why and Whither , 11 Newsweek ,
XXXII (November 29 , 1948) , 26.
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that can be drawn about the polling process , as illustrated
by the election of 1948 , show that such methods are compli cated; therefore , i t will probably be many years before the
processes can be refined enough to be termed scientific . 8
The findings of the average man , the pollsters , news
correspondents , and magazine editor s may all be considered
non- scientific opinions , most of them associated with pr ejudice of some sort and all of them produced with a small
amount of investigation involved .

Such , however , was not

the case with the impartial investigation of the 1948 Presidential election which was conducted by the Social Science
Research Council .
ber 27 , 1948.

This group pr oduced its report on Decem-

The pollsters and other leading sources of

findings turned their information over to the Social Science
Research Council who , in turn , appointed a committee to find
out exactly why the public opinion polls had been so far
"off base" in their predictions in 1948 .

The members of the

committee ranged from Harvard and Yale professors to the
president of a television network .

In addition to the com-

mittee proper , a staff was appointed to gather and analyze
data and prepare a preliminary report . 9
8
Letter to the Editor of the New York Times , November
20, 1948 .
------9News item in the New York Times , November 18 , 1948 .

66
The committee studied polling and decided to follow
an eight- step process :

(1)

establish a proper sample by

including a cross section of voters in the sample; (2)

pre -

pare an effective questionnaire and train the interviewer
in the proper method of presenting and correcting the ques tionnaire; (3)

take care in the selection of the people to

be interviewed ; (4)
(5)

be objective in interviewing technique;

decide how many of the people interviewed will actually

vote ; (6)

decide what should be done with the people who

are "undecided" and those who are of " no opinion ; " (7)
process the data correctly (this will include adjustments
and corrections) and , (8)

devise a method to interpret and

present the results . lO
After personnel were selected and a process was
adopted , the staff began to investigate polling results
from the three major public opinion polls .

The polls had

not only made surveys during the 1948 election , they had
also presented the results to the public via newspapers and
radio .

How had they represented their findings?

Had

they printed cold , hard statistics without confusing quali fications or had they released spiced descriptions to make
1
°Frederick Mosteller , The Pre-election Polls of 1948
(New York : Social Science Research Council , 1949) , p-.-3-.---
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accounts newsworthy , but inaccurate. 11

To answer these

questions involves a look at newspapers which publicized
the results of the pre- election predictions .

For example ,

Roper's polling service always suggested a headline for the
newspapers to use; however, the suggested headline was
rarely used .

Newspapers often dramatized or distorted the

polling results by the substitution of a sensational head line .

Parts of reports submitted by the pollsters were

sometimes omitted to save space .

This sometimes caused dis-

tortions of the reports.l2
Most of the time , there was a lapse between the time
the poll was taken and the time the results were publicly
announced .

Unless the exact date of the poll was announced

when publicized , there would be a distortion of the results
in the minds of the public .
were at fault .

Here , the polling organizations

They seldom provided the news media with

exact dates on which their polls were taken .
around" giving this information by :

(1)

They "got

telling when the

poll - taking had ended , but provided no information about its
beginning date; (2)

they stated that the release contained

no suggested date of termination; (3)
11
12

Ibid ., p . 29 .
Ibid ., pp . 34- 36 .

or they casually
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mentioned the period when the poll was taken, causing the
date to look insignificant.l3
Not only did the reporters of poll opinions fail to
report when polls were taken, they often failed to report
the sizes and variability factors of samples used.

The size

of the sample was never indicated by the pre-election polls
in 1948.

The variability of the sample was only occasion-

ally presented.

Crossley ignored the variability factors

in the first of his releases and inserted a phrase such as
"normal mathematical limitations of results taken from
samples of the population" 14 in five out of his last seven
releases.

The Gallup organization referred to variability

in two special releases, but not in thirty-nine regular
releases.

Roper made only one mention of variability.l5

The success of the entire polling operation depends
on the sampling method and the cross section which it
yields.

Crossley made only one mention of composition.

Gallup mentioned it in two special releases.
not mention it at all.

Roper did

To understand the responses made

within the poll, the public should be aware of the questions
asked.

Gallup was the only one of the three polling
14
15

Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., pp. 36-38.
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agencies who published the list of his questions for the
public to see.

All of the "big three" were vague on adjust-

ments they made in the interpretation of data .

None

indicated a process of analysis . 16
Because many uncertainties are connected with the art
of polling as peoples' views change from day to day , in
publicizing the results of their findings the polls should
not state dogmatically what is happening .
can only state what might happen .

At best , they

The uncertainty of the

pollsters should be indicated in their press releases .
can be done in special ways .

(l)

This

A simple sentence can be

used to describe the sample or the population which a sample
represents .

(2)

Every verb describing polling can be put

into the past tense to indicate that the press release can
be applied only to the time period when the sample was
taken .

(3)

A press release can be qualified by using

adverbs such as "probably" or a verb such as "seems . "

Not

one of the three described the sample of population its
poll represented .

Crossley was the only pollster who wrote

in past tense, and the Crossley organization only used quali fiers in forty - seven per cent of its releases . l7
16
17

Ibid ., p. 39 .
Ibid ., p . 50 .
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Investigations of the press releases of Crossley,
Gallup, and Roper indicate that the three major polls used
journalistic rather than scientific methods to publicize
their findings.

They failed to describe what process they

used or to indicate the limitation of their particular
process.

Failing to inform the public , they distorted

their findings.l8

This was one major conclusion of the

Social Science Research Council.
Next the committee turned to the problem of measuring
the error that came from the very fact that the survey was
a public opinion survey .

The variability involved in pre-

dicting the electoral vote in a Presidential election was
recognized.

The average beginning margin of error was set

at three percentage points .

This omitted errors on the

state level which would have made the percentage of error
much higher .

The closest that the poll - takers could pos-

sibly get to a specific estimate of Truman's electoral vote
would have been to have said that he would get anywhere
from 234 to 298 electoral votes .

With such variability

in estimates of the electoral vote, it seems unreasonable
to expect that polling organizations could predict the
electoral vote to any satisfactory degree of accuracy.
a polling organization cannot be expected to predict the
18 Ibid ., p . 73.

If
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electoral vote very accurately , it is unreasonable to expect
the winner of a Presidential election to be accurately pre dieted .

Even if the pollsters could predict the popular

vote to a certain extent the electoral vote wins the Presi dential elections . 19
Most studies do not try to allow for or explain the
change from forty- nine to fifty - one per cent that is so
important a variation band in predicting the electoral vote .
Systematic errors of at least three per cent are common in
elections .

Here is a table showing the hypothetical situ-

ation of only two parties running in 1948 and the possibility
of making a correct prediction with systematic error involved:
Systematic error toward
Republicans in percentage
points
0
1

2
3

Aver age electoral
vote predicted
for Truman
316
283
252
224

Chances
of failure
10- 100
33- 100
63- 100
74- 100
20

The committee examined the use of cr oss sections in
the pre - election polls .
quota sampling method .

All three major polls used the
One way to describe this method is

to imagine that there are 1 , 000 beans in a barrel , 700 of the
beans being white, while the other 300 beans are black.
19
20

Ibid .
Ibid ., p . 77 .

If
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a person scoops up 100 beans from this barrel, he should
get approximately 70 white and 30 black beans.

The range

of the possible error can be computed mathematically.

As

long as the barrel contains a significant amount of beans,
the proportion should remain within the mathematical margin
of error 997 times out of 1,000 .
lem was threefold.

The pollster's true prob-

(1) He had to work out the true ratios

involved in determining the composition of the "barrel;"
(2) he had to choose his respondents (persons interviewed)
carefully; and, (3) he had to be sure that the ratio that
he had worked out and the respondents he had chosen to be
interviewed corresponded exactly.21
Several weaknesses in the quota sampling process can
be observed.

In the 1948 election , the samples were repre-

sentative of the 1948 vote in the sections from which they
were drawn.

All three major polls under- represented the

lower class in their polls .

It was assumed that since the

educated higher class usually turns out to vote in a higher
proportion than the lower class , the former should be more
heavily interviewed.

It is unlikely that proper results

could ever have been obtained since this assumption was
2111 The Black and White Beans," Time, LI (May 3, 1948),

21.
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followed .

Finally , ther e was a large systematic error in

the 1948 election .

This more than anything else is respon-

sible for the distor tion in the final results . 22

Although

statistical evidence is not available to measure how much
the quota sampling method contributed to unpredictable (systematic) err ors involved in the 1948 election pr edictions ,
there was a great amount of systematic error .
It may well have been due to the fallibility of the
interviewers or respondents that there was in the 1948
sampling system .

The committee concluded:

"The mere fact

that the measurements cannot be made is itself a serious
weakness of the method . II 23
An investigation into the interviewer and his influ ence must necessarily be scanty , for statistical information
regarding this element is not abundant .
to evaluate them by examining :

(1)

race , class , and poli -

tical composition of interviewers ; (2)
to control bias ; (3)

The committee tried

evaluating attempts

determining how to measure cheating ;

(4)

estimating how well the interviewer did on the job ;

(5)

and re - evaluating interviewers' training practices.

committee concluded that the reason that nothing concrete
22
23

Frederick Mosteller , QQ . cit ., pp . 113- 115 .
.

Ib1d ., pp . 115- 116 .

The
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could be said about this area was because pollster and statistical expert alike had neglected this area of study.
Pollsters and students of polling were to be blamed because
of their lack of study in this important area of polling. 24
The questionnaire itself presented as many problems
to the council as the questioner and questioned did.
area of questionnaire design is a complex one.

The

Basically,

this area can be broken down into three sections:

(1)

How

well does the questionnaire elicit a person's true desire
to carry through and actually vote for the person the respondent has outwardly declared himself to be for?

(2)

How well

does the questionnaire allow for the uncommitted voter?
(3)

Does the questionnaire adequately cover the question

of eligibility of voters?

It can be readily seen that the

preparation of questionnaires to measure the psychological
committment of, for example, a person's intention to vote,
must be haphazard at best.

The questionnaires can be tech-

nically perfect, which incidentally, they were not in 1948,
and there will still be room for error. 25
When all of the other steps are taken, processing and
adjusting of the data follow.
24
25

Ibid., p. 148.
Ibid., pp. 153-162.

As can be seen from a study
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of the different steps involved in the process of polltaking , by the time the process reached the final stage in
the 1948 Presidential election , crucial errors had already
been made .

Even if the pollsters had correctly evaluated

their data and processed it thoroughly , adjusting as they
went , the results would have been inaccurate simply because
of the errors already latent in the process .

To complicate

matters , the pollster s stopped polling in the last two or
three weeks before the election , thereby missing the lastminute swing to Truman .

This meant their failure in

adequately measuring the undecided votes . 26
Preliminary observations prepared by the staff of the
committee on analysis of the pr e- election polls and forecasts
are as follows :

(1)

The pollsters took on too large a task

when they attempted to predict the winner of the 1948 Presi dential election .
educated guess .

Such a prediction could only be an
(2)

The pollsters could have predicted a

closer contest if they had studied their data more care fully .

(3)

Polling process is complex , involving eight

crucial steps .

The pollsters erred most in sampling and

interviewing techniques, publicizing results , predicting
behavior of undecided voters , and accounting for the
26

Ibid. , pp. 174- 244 .
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last-minute swing to Truman .

(4)

The errors were due to

the same things as in previous elections , but the errors
''showed" more in the 1948 election because it was a close
one .
cess .
facts .

(5)

Error existed at every step of the polling pro -

(6)

The publicizing of polling results distorted

This needs to be corrected.

be scorned by the public .

(7)

Polling should not

Occasional failures , like the one

in 1948 , do not cancel out the value of polling .

However ,

in the 1948 Presidential election , evidence presented proves
that the polls were inaccurate in creating the almost total
aura of defeat they predicted for Truman . 27
The conclusions drawn by the committee proper were
these:

(1)

the errors in 1948 were not much different than

in previous years , but this discovery should not have reduced
interest in pollsters' trying to find a way to eliminate
errors involved in election forecasting; (2)

quota sampling ,

as used by the major polls , is not superior to persistence
prediction; 28 (3)

techniques are not varied , and therefore

will repeat themselves; (4)

basic research of poll-taking

itself must be undertaken , and every part of the polling
27

Ibid ., pp . 290- 291 .

28
Persistence prediction states that conditions will
repeat themselves . What happened last year is likely to
happen again .
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process itself must be examined and radically improved before
the pollsters can again make election forecasts with confidence; (5)

in the past , the pollsters have failed to educate

the public about the margin of error involved in polling .
Instead , they have taken undue credit for what they have
done .

Now they are reaping an equally undue amount of

criticism about their polling process . 29

29

Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky , Presidential
Elections : Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New
York : Charles Scribner ' s Sons , 1964) , pp . 137- 138 .

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Truman-Dewey Presidential contest was marked by
distorted predictions .

When Truman took office in 1945 , he

was well - liked because of his honest and homespun personality.

Soon , however , this evaluation became a detriment

to him .

The public compared him with Roosevelt , and the

contrast between the two was obvious .

Roosevelt ' s name

and personality were famous; Truman was an unknown; therefore , the Presidency was Truman ' s , but the office's dignity
still belonged to Roosevelt .

Truman was handicapped in

implementing the policies of his predecessor.

He felt that

he must pay obeisance to the Roosevelt version of the New
Deal; and , because of this , he was to be handicapped .

His

inactivity in decision- making caused a "bewildered'' tag to
be placed upon his early administration.
The Congressional elections of 1946 provided an early
turning point toward the Truman victory in 1948 .

Superfi -

cially , the 1946 Republican victory seemed to indicate that
the Democrats were hopelessly divided , and that the Republicans were gaining , politically speaking .

Actually , the

1946 Republican victory proved to be a "shot in the arm'' for
President Truman.

Observers considered the 1946 elections

79
in Congress as a repudiati on of Roosevelt ' s New Deal as
administered by Roosevelt.

From 1946 to 1948 , Truman was

expected to initiate a program of his own to replace Roose velt's which he had been trying frantically to keep in
effect.

For the first time , he took the offensive in poli -

tical affairs ; therefore , it may be said that the 1946
election transformed Truman from a follower to a leader .
To most observers , however , Truman ' s new policies in 1946
and 1947 seemed to be leading the Democratic Party down the
road to disaster.

The President took a strong stand on

civil rights and vetoed the Taft- Hartley Act .

He advocated

a "get tough policy" in regard to Russia , and supported
economic price controls .

It is hard to say whether Truman

so acted with a political motive in mind , but whatever his
intentions may have been , most of these maneuvers contributed to his victory in 1948 .

The veto of the Taft- Hartley

Act gained much support from labor.

The stand on price

controls gained a good part of the farm vote .

His stand on

civil rights alienated part of the South , but gained many
liberal votes .

Ironically , the homespun Truman personality

which gained him the title of "muddler" in 1946 was to
become the chief factor in the Truman victory in 1948 .

The

very factors that contributed to the pessimistic attitude of
most forecasters in 1946 were key factors in the Truman
victory two years later.
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Just before the convention , in early 1948 , the odds
against a Truman victory increased again .

Henry Wallace

announced his candidacy for President on the Progressive
ticket .

He was expected to draw as many as ten million

votes from the Democratic fold .

The South opposed Truman

and threatened to vote in a bloc for Strom Thurmond , 11 Dixiecrat11 candidate for President .

Most indicative of the mood

of the political experts was the "draft Eisenhower" movement
that took place in June of 1948 because the Democratic Party
did not think that Truman could win re - election .

They began

a rather desperate search for a suitable candidate .
hower refused to be drafted.

Eisen-

If the Democrats did not want

to support Truman , what hope was there for a Truman victory
in November?
The Republicans nominated Thomas Dewey , a candidate
they considered a safe one to oppose Truman in 1948 .

Dewey's

record as District Attorney and Governor of New York, and
his proven nation- wide vote - getting ability (23 , 000 , 000
popular votes against Roosevelt in 1944) qualified him as
a strong Truman opponent .
With reluctance , Truman was renominated at the Democratic National Convention in early July .

He set the

pattern for his campaign which followed with a firey
acceptance speech .

The highlight of the speech was
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Truman ' s announcement that he was calling the Eightieth
Congress back into session so that they could do the things
their platform said they stood for .
a political one .

The move was obviously

The "Turnip Day Maneuver" was denounced

at the time but proved to be quite effective.

The tactic

successfully linked Governor Dewey with the "do - nothing"
Eightieth Congress and gave Truman something to attack .
Truman developed a major means of delivering that
attack in his chaotic "give 'em Hell" campaign.
something to prove to the people.

He had

If he had not found some

way to attract the public ' s attention and obtain their sympathy , there would have been little chance for his victory.
The campaign tactics fitted the Truman personality .

He was

an average middle - class American who understood the "common
man."

He was at his best when speaking extemporaneously .

He was not a polished orator , and it would have been diffi cult for him to conduct a dignified , orderly campaign.

It

had been demonstrated in 1945 that Truman had little talent
to implement someone else ' s program.

He was at his best

when on the offensive , and his campaign in 1948 was a vivid
example of this .
Thomas Dewey , on the other hand , conducted a ••safe"
campaign .

Dewey later was much maligned for playing into

Truman's hands by allowing him to make the issues , while
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Dewey spoke of unity , God , and country .
strategy in 1948 .

Yet , this was sound

Being the favorite , Dewey felt that if he

took the offensive , he might alienate some conservative
Republican voters while gaining nothing from the Indepen dents and Democrats .

Most critics agree that the basic

fault in the Dewey campaign lay in his overconfidence and
cold personality .

Dewey did not campaign hard enough

because he felt that he could not lose .

Being opposite to

Truman personality- wise proved to be a detriment to his
victory.
The farmers also played an important part in the
Republican defeat .

The Democratic New Deal which had been

good to the farmers caused them to be reluctant to change
loyalties .

Labor supported Truman because he vetoed the

Taft- Hartley Act .

These two groups provided Truman with the

votes necessary to offset the loss of part of the South
and the Wallace votP. .
Practically no one correctly predicted the election
outcome .

In campaign days news correspondents and other

political observers took the ''easy way out . "
polls do their thinking for them .

They let the

The polls were largely

responsible for the creation of the consensus that Truman
would lose in 1948.
They all predicted an unqualified Dewey victory.
Even though the polls were widely accepted as scientific
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measurement of established opinion , they proved to be
unscientific.
cess .

They attempted to simplify a complex pro-

The result was a prediction that was little better

than a calculated guess .

Furthermore , the polls attempted

virtually an impossible task -- that of objectively publi cizing their polling results .

They were caught in the

pressure to make newsworthy items of their polling results.
Because of this , the pollsters made unqualified predictions
that they were unable to substantiate.

It was possible to

get away with this during the Roosevelt years because the
elections were not close; however , when a close election
came , their errors were spotlighted and their incompetence
was shown.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the pollsters'
mistakes .

First of all , the process of polling in elections

does have great potential and should not entirely be ignored.
In using them , it should be remembered that they are not
totally reliable.
unquestioned .

Their influence on public opinion is

Particularly was this true in 1948 .

The

danger exists even today that unscrupulous persons could
shape public opinion with carefully prepared polls .

Perhaps

a more scientific use of polls , for example conducting them
for predictions but not publicizing them as truth , would
be a more accurate use of them .

As they are used , in
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either way , it should be remembered that people are unpredictable.

No one has yet been able to map out the mind of

the individual in black and white.

Whatever else can be

said , the Presidential election of 1948 verified this fact.
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Many periodicals , books , and newspapers described
the events that made up the Truman victory in 1948 .

The

Truman Presidency by Cabell Phillips , The Pre - election Polls
of 1948 , prepared by the Social Science Research Council ,
and news items from the New York Times were particularly
valuable .
Several factors made the Truman victory in 1948
unique .

Never had a Presidential candidate for re- election

faced more formidable odds against victory .

Upon taking

office in 1945 , Truman was compared with Franklin D. Roose velt who had been regarded as a great President.

Truman

was considered to be an incompetent bungler by the loyal
followers of Roosevelt .
The Congressional elections of 1946 seemed to confirm
the opinion of the New Dealers .

Truman ' s popularity was at

an all - time low , and discontent was high among the public.
However , the repudiation of the Truman version of the New
Deal turned out to be a blessing in disguise .

The Con-

gressional defeat required Truman to come up with a program
of his own .

Truman took the initiative by creating a strong

civil rights program , vetoing the Taft- Hartley bill, and
taking a strong stand on pr ice controls .
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By early 1948 , the majority of political experts
considered the chances of a Truman victory as next to
nothing .

Henry Wallace , a former Democratic president under

Roosevelt , became alarmed over Truman ' s "get tough" policy
with Russia and bolted the party to run for President on
the Progressive ticket .

He was expected to take numerous

popular votes away from Truman .

In addition , Truman had

alienated the South with a strong stand on civil rights .
Early in 1948 , it looked as though Truman might lose a good
portion of the Democratic "solid South . "

The worst blow

to the Truman campaign was the "draft Eisenhower" movement .

Many New Dealers and other disaffected liberals

decided that Truman was unfit to run for President and
attempted to draft General Dwight D. Eisenhower , a political
novice , for the job .

The movement gained momentary appeal

until Eisenhower stopped the clamor with an unqualified
repudiation of the "draft Ike" organization .
Truman was renominated with reluctance at the
Democratic Convention in July .

Very few gave him much

of a chance for victory in November .

Truman began his cam-

paign of desperation by calling the Eightieth Congress back
into session .

This political move was criticized by the

press , but focused the eyes of the nation on the Republican
"do nothing" Congress .

Truman's fighting tactics caught
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the imagination of the public .

In addition to attacking

Congress , he attacked his opponent ' s "me too'' campaign and
insinuated that a vote for the Republicans was a vote
against prosperity and the common man .

Despite his ener-

getic campaign , Truman was still rated at the bottom by
the pollsters , who all predicted a Dewey landslide .
When the results were in , Truman had accomplished
the biggest upset in American political history by defeating
Thomas Dewey .

Truman ' s effective campaign , combined with

Republican overconfidence , were deciding factors in the
victory .

Other major reasons for the Truman victory were

the heavy support given him by labor and the farmers seeking
to maintain their own prosperity.
It is evident , in retrospect , that the majority of
predictors let the public opinion polls do their thinking
for them .

The polls were wrong because they oversimplified

the task of polling and allowed themselves to be controlled
to a certain extent by the news media .

By failing to take

into account the undecided vote and the last minute swing to
Truman , the polls completely misread the public mind .
The election of 1948 was a valuable lesson for the
pollsters and has given them the incentive to improve their
system.

The campaign was also a tribute to the fighting

spirit of Harry S. Truman and the public that re - elected
him President of the United States in 1948 .

